Abstract

Most of the traditional theories of metaphor explain metaphor in terms of metaphorical meaning. However, in a reaction against such theories, Grice , Davidson , Searle , Martinich , and Fogelin , claim that metaphor is not a matter of meaning but rather one of use. The basis of their analysis is the assumption of a distinction between meaning and use, one that is thought to correspond to a distinction between semantics and pragmatics. When expressed in terms of the latter distinction, the claim of these philosophers is that metaphor, rather than being a matter of semantics , is one of pragmatics. ;In this paper we use an examination of Davidson's critique of semantic theories of metaphor and metaphorical meaning and the alternative non-semantic analyses provided by Davidson, Searle, and others to compile a list of conditions a theory of metaphor should meet. When completed, this list specifies that a theory of metaphor should account for: metaphoricity ; the fact that in processing metaphors we learn something about the world rather than about language; the difficulty of specifying the truth conditions of some metaphors; the classification of metaphorical content consistent with the framework; metaphorical content and truth; the relationship between metaphor and simile; the variety in types of metaphors; the incorporation of some metaphors into the language; and why metaphors are used. ;Finally, assuming both a distinction between meaning and use and a distinction between meaning and content , we propose an analysis of metaphor in which a metaphorical utterance is held to express a metaphorical content other than their literal content, the metaphorical content of a metaphorical utterance constitutes the proposition expressed by that utterance, and metaphoricity stems from a reconceptualization of the class and taxonomy underlying literal uses of the terms