Wittgenstein and Generative Theories of Language and Linguistic Competence
Dissertation, University of California, Irvine (
1995)
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Abstract
A supposition which underlies and guides much theoretical work in linguistics and philosophy is that ordinary speakers "internally represent" recursive systems of linguistic rules. This supposition is not only pervasive; it is also extremely persuasive, for it is supported by a nest of very powerful arguments. Perhaps the most compelling of these is the argument from linguistic creativity, viz. that apparently the only explanation of how ordinary speakers with finite brains can understand an infinite number of sentences involves such systems of rules. Now, this argument and others like it raise an interesting problem for the student of the later Wittgenstein. On the one hand, they are entirely incompatible with this philosopher's adamant rejection of the "calculus" view of language. On the other hand, since they were formulated only after Wittgenstein's death, it is not clear how Wittgenstein would try to undermine them. ;The challenge, then, is to mount, on the basis of Wittgenstein's later writings, an attack against these arguments and the methodological supposition which they bolster. This challenge is met by my dissertation. I show first that the argument from linguistic creativity tacitly presupposes very basic views of understanding and meaning which Wittgenstein had compelling, albeit neglected, reasons for rejecting. I then argue that, contrary to the opinion of most analytic philosophers and linguists, Wittgenstein can account for the ordinary speaker's ability to understand an infinite number of sentences without invoking recursive systems of rules. ;Finally, I demonstrate that all of the remaining evidence for the methodological supposition either is a disguised version of the argument from linguistic creativity or is based upon highly controversial philosophical assumptions.