Utility, Priority and Possible People

Utilitas 11 (1):16 (1999)
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Abstract

This paper discusses what the so-called Priority View implies regarding possible people. It is argued that this view is plausible when applied to fixed populations, but that, when applied to the issue of possible people, it faces certain difficulties. If it is claimed that possible people fall within the scope of the Priority View, we are led to the repugnant conclusion at a faster pace than we are by, e.g., utilitarianism. And if it is claimed that possible people do not fall within the scope of the Priority View, we shall have to combine this view with a different view in order to avoid certain counter-intuitive judgements. Such a combined view, however, leads to intransitivities. At the end of the paper, I discuss what these conclusions imply regarding both the Priority View and our moral obligations to possible people

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Nils Holtug
University of Copenhagen

Citations of this work

The Sum of Well-Being.Jacob M. Nebel - 2023 - Mind 132 (528):1074–1104.
The Benefits of Coming into Existence.Krister Bykvist - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):335-362.
On the value of coming into existence.Nils Holtug - 2001 - The Journal of Ethics 5 (4):361-384.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Philosophy 63 (243):119-122.
Equality or Priority?Derek Parfit - 2001 - In John Harris (ed.), Bioethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 81-125.
Intransitivity and the mere addition paradox.Larry S. Temkin - 1987 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (2):138-187.

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