Kinds of warrant : a Confucian response to Plantinga's theory of the knowledge of the ultimate

In M. T. Stepani͡ant͡s (ed.), Knowledge and Belief in the Dialogue of Cultures. Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper uses Alvin Plantinga’s notion of “warrant” as a reference to show that Confucian beliefs are warranted in a different sense. It is warranted through an immanent reflection, determination, and manifestation of human virtues, not through a transcendental plan. By comparing Plantinga’s theory of warranted Christian beliefs and the Confucian approach to its own beliefs, I try to explain why Confucians are not worried about whether their beliefs are in general true or not.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-09-15

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Peimin Ni
Grand Valley State University

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references