Naïve Realism and the Explanatory Role of Visual Phenomenology

Argumenta 2:219-231 (2016)
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Abstract

This paper argues that naïve realism has an epistemic advantage over other rival views. The argument consists of two steps. First, I argue that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience plays an indispensable role in explaining how we can refer to the experience as a justificatory reason for a demonstrative judgment. Second, I argue that only naïve realism can coherently allow a veridical visual experience to be used as a factive reason.

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Takuya Niikawa
Kobe University

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