On human needs and moral appraisals

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 6 (1-4):170 – 183 (1963)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

For a large and important range of cases the connection between ?X needs y? and ?X ought to have y?, though not an entailment, is still non?contingent. Sentences in which ?needs? occurs have several uses) one of which is normative; when such sentences are used to make statements, the statements constitute a good reason for asserting that what is needed ought to be done. It must, however, be recognized that such a reason may not be a sufficient reason for the moral appraisal that what is needed ought to be done. It is not self?contradictory to assert ?He needs it but he ought not to have it?, though in moral contexts if it is stated that someone needs something or that something is needed we are entitled to infer that, everything else being equal, he should have it or that it should be done. But often there are countervailing considerations which defeat that initial presumption. I attempt to support these contentions by 1) describing several key uses of ?need sentences? and 2) by elucidating the relations between the uses of such sentences and moral judgments

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,509

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-02-04

Downloads
19 (#582,839)

6 months
2 (#277,663)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Contextual Implication.Isabel C. Hungerland - 1960 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 3 (1-4):211 – 258.
Remarks on the Concept of Knowledge.Justus Hartnack - 1961 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 4 (1-4):270 – 273.

Add more references