Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):549-577 (2018)

Authors
Carlo Nicolai
King's College London
Abstract
We discuss the principles for a primitive, object-linguistic notion of consequence proposed by ) that yield a version of Curry’s paradox. We propose and study several strategies to weaken these principles and overcome paradox: all these strategies are based on the intuition that the object-linguistic consequence predicate internalizes whichever meta-linguistic notion of consequence we accept in the first place. To these solutions will correspond different conceptions of consequence. In one possible reading of these principles, they give rise to a notion of logical consequence: we study the corresponding theory of validity by showing that it is conservative over a wide range of base theories: this result is achieved via a well-behaved form of local reduction. The theory of logical consequence is based on a restriction of the introduction rule for the consequence predicate. To unrestrictedly maintain this principle, we develop a conception of object-linguistic consequence, which we call grounded consequence, that displays a restriction of the structural rule of reflexivity. This construction is obtained by generalizing Saul Kripke’s inductive theory of truth. Grounded validity will be shown to satisfy several desirable principles for a naïve, self-applicable notion of consequence.
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-017-9438-x
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References found in this work BETA

Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Structural Proof Theory.Sara Negri, Jan von Plato & Aarne Ranta - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 37 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Generalized Revenge.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):153-177.
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One Step is Enough.David Ripley - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-27.
Inferences and Metainferences in ST.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (6):1057-1077.

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