On the import and rationale of value attribution

Mind and Society 4 (1):115-127 (2005)
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Abstract

The article urges a negative answer to the question if values merely lie ‘‘in the eyes of the beholder’’. It argues the objectivity of values via their status as tertiary properties that are neither on dispositionally inherent in their objects nor yet affective (dispositionally evoked in the interaction between objects and sense–observers), but rather reflective in being dispositionally evoked in suitably competent minds considering the matters involved.

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Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh

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