Deflationary truth and the ontology of expressions

Synthese 192 (12):4031-4055 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The existence of a close connection between results on axiomatic truth and the analysis of truth-theoretic deflationism is nowadays widely recognized. The first attempt to make such link precise can be traced back to the so-called conservativeness argument due to Leon Horsten, Stewart Shapiro and Jeffrey Ketland: by employing standard Gödelian phenomena, they concluded that deflationism is untenable as any adequate theory of truth leads to consequences that were not achievable by the base theory alone. In the paper I highlight, as Shapiro and Ketland, the irreducible nature of truth axioms with respect to their base theories. But, I argue, this does not immediately delineate a notion of truth playing a substantial role in philosophical or scientific explanations. I first offer a refinement of Hartry Field’s reaction to the conservativeness argument by distinguishing between metatheoretic and object-theoretic consequences of the theory of truth and address some possible rejoinders. In the resulting picture, truth is an irreducible tool for metatheoretic ascent. How robust is this characterizaton? I test it by considering: a recent example, due to Leon Horsten, of the alleged explanatory role played by the truth predicate in the derivation of Fitch’s paradox; an essential weakening of theories of truth analyzed in the first part of the paper

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,960

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the Logicality of Truth.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):853-874.
Deflationism beyond arithmetic.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1045-1069.
Beth's theorem and deflationism.Timothy Bays - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):1061-1073.
Theories and Theories of Truth.Ryan Christensen - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (1):31-43.
Deflationism, conservativeness and maximality.Cezary Cieśliński - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):695 - 705.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-24

Downloads
60 (#361,159)

6 months
8 (#636,535)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Carlo Nicolai
King's College London

References found in this work

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
A logical analysis of some value concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.

View all 37 references / Add more references