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On Phenomenal Functionalism about the Properties of Virtual and Non-virtual Objects
Disputatio 11 (55):399-410 (2019)
Abstract
According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Spatiotemporal functionalism v. the conceivability of zombies.David J. Chalmers - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):488-497.
References found in this work
Psychological predicates.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Art, mind, and religion. [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 37--48.
Moderate structural realism about space-time.Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):27 - 46.
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