Disputatio 11 (55):399-410 (2019)

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Alyssa Ney
University of California, Davis
Abstract
According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.
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DOI 10.2478/disp-2019-0005
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References found in this work BETA

Constructing the World.David J. Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Psychological Predicates.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In W. H. Capitan & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 37--48.
The Virtual and the Real.David J. Chalmers - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (46):309-352.
Psychological Predicates.Hilary Putnam - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Virtual as the Digital.David J. Chalmers - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (55):453-486.

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