Disputatio 11 (55):399-410 (2019)
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According to phenomenal functionalism, whether some object or event has a given property is determined by the kinds of sensory experiences such objects or events typically cause in normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions. This paper challenges this position and, more specifically, David Chalmers’s use of it in arguing for what he calls virtual realism.
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| DOI | 10.2478/disp-2019-0005 |
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References found in this work BETA
Psychological Predicates.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In W. H. Capitan & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 37--48.
Moderate Structural Realism About Space-Time.Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):27 - 46.
Psychological Predicates.Hilary Putnam - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Spatiotemporal Functionalism V. The Conceivability of Zombies.David J. Chalmers - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):488-497.
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2019-06-23
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