What is a Picture?: Depiction, Realism, Abstraction

New York: Palgrave-Macmillan (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Using an approach deeply informed by philosophy of art, art history and perceptual psychology, this book places seeing at the centre of an original theory of pictorial representation and explores the ramifications such a theory has for the visual arts.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 79,794

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Resemblance, Restriction, and Content‐Bearing Features.John Dilworth - 2005 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (1):67–70.
Ideas about art.Kathleen Kadon Desmond - 2011 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Pictures and Properties.Ben Blumson - 2014 - In Resemblance and Representation. Open Book Publishers. pp. 179-198.
Pictures and singular thought.John Zeimbekis - 2010 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (1):11-21.
Taking twofoldness seriously: Walton on imagination and depiction.Bence Nanay - 2004 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (3):285–289.
Pictures, colour and resemblance.Michael Newall - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):587–595.
A restriction for pictures and some consequences for a theory of depiction.Michael Newall - 2003 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (4):381–394.
Pictures, pictorial contents and vision.Dominic Gregory - 2010 - British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1):15-32.
Pictorial realism.Catharine Abell - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):1 – 17.
Defining depiction.Ben Blumson - 2009 - British Journal of Aesthetics 49 (2):143-157.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-21

Downloads
14 (#750,943)

6 months
5 (#166,760)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Newall
University of Kent

Citations of this work

Semantics of Pictorial Space.Gabriel Greenberg - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):847-887.
Why, as responsible for figurativity, seeing-in can only be inflected seeing-in.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):651-667.
Twofold Pictorial Experience.René Jagnow - 2019 - Erkenntnis (4):1-22.
Pictorial experience: not so special after all.Alon Chasid - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):471-491.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references