The ALARM Theory of Consciousness: A Two-Level Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (3):84-105 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The scientific investigation of consciousness generates new findings at a rapid pace. We argue that we need a novel theoretical framework, which we call the ALARM theory of consciousness, in order to account for all central observations. According to this theory, we need to distinguish two levels of consciousness, namely basic arousal and general alertness. Basic arousal functions as a specific alarm system, keeping a biological organism alive under sudden intense threats, and general alertness enables flexible learning and behavioural strategies. This two-level theory of consciousness helps us to account for (i) recent discoveries of subcortical brain activities with a central role of thalamic processes, (ii) observations of differences in the behavioural repertoire of non-human animals indicating two types of conscious experiences. Furthermore, the framework enables us (iii) to unify the neural evidence for the relevance of subcortical processes, on the one hand, and of cortico-cortical loops, on the other, and finally (iv) to clarify the evolutionary and actual functional role of conscious experiences.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Sartre: una teoría auto-representacional de la conciencia.Esteban Diego Ortiz Medina - 2018 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 11:115-137.
Sartre: A Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness.Esteban Diego Ortiz Medina - 2018 - Journal of Humanities of Valparaiso 11:115-137.
Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.David Jehie - 2004 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (4):495.
Phenomenal Consciousness.Dmitry Ivanov - 2009 - Analytica 3:19-36.
Global Workspace Theory and Animal Consciousness.Jonathan Birch - 2020 - Philosophical Topics 48 (1):21-37.
Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.
Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-04-06

Downloads
30 (#459,346)

6 months
13 (#118,494)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Albert Newen
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Carlos Montemayor
San Francisco State University

References found in this work

On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.

Add more references