Self-Conscious Self-Reference: An Approach Based on Agent's Knowledge (DPhil manuscript)

Dissertation, Oxford University (2004)
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Abstract

This thesis proposes that an account of first-person reference and first-person thinking requires an account of practical knowledge. At a minimum, first-person reference requires at least a capacity for knowledge of the intentional act of reference. More typically, first-person reasoning requires deliberation and the ability to draw inferences while entertaining different 'I' thoughts. Other accounts of first-person reference--such as the perceptual account and the rule-based account--are criticized as inadequate. An account of practical knowledge is provided by an interpretation of GEM Anscombe's account in her landmark monograph "Intention".

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Anne Newstead
Swinburne University of Technology

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