Law and Philosophy 33 (1):75-104 (2014)

Blain Neufeld
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Chad Van Schoelandt
Tulane University
Susan Okin criticizes John Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ because it does not apply principles of justice directly to gender relations within households. We explain how one can be a ‘political liberal feminist’ by distinguishing between two kinds of justice: the first we call ‘legitimacy justice’, conceptions of which apply to the ‘legally coercive structure’ of society; the second we call ‘ethos justice’, conceptions of which apply to citizens’ ‘non-coercive’ relations. We agree with Okin that a society in which most persons act in accordance with ‘gender equal’ ethos justice is morally superior to one in which most persons do not. A shared commitment to a particular conception of ethos justice, however, cannot be required by a conception of legitimacy justice. A political liberal feminist is committed to promoting gender equality with respect to both legitimacy justice and ethos justice, but recognizes that different means are necessary to do so
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DOI 10.1007/s10982-013-9174-5
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References found in this work BETA

The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism.Charles Larmore - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (12):599.
Respect, Recognition, and Public Reason.James W. Boettcher - 2007 - Social Theory and Practice 33 (2):223-249.
Is Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?Christie Hartley & Lori Watson - 2010 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (1):121.
Coercion, the Basic Structure, and the Family.Blain Neufeld - 2009 - Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (1):37-54.
Perfectionism, Feminism and Public Reason.Amy R. Baehr - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (2):193 - 222.

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Citations of this work BETA

Shared Intentions, Public Reason, and Political Autonomy.Blain Neufeld - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):776-804.
Public Reason.Jonathan Quong - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Justification, Coercion, and the Place of Public Reason.Chad Van Schoelandt - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1031-1050.
Public Justification.Kevin Vallier - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Publicity, Reciprocity, and Incentives.Andrew Lister - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):67-82.

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