Abstract

My aim is to show that a revised version of political liberalism constitutes a compelling approach to theorizing about contemporary political issues. ;In chapter one I explain that John Rawls's move to political liberalism is not motivated by a practical concern with ensuring social stability, as many critics claim, but rather is thoroughly normative in nature: it has to do with ensuring the political legitimacy of the conception of justice that is to govern the basic structure of contemporary pluralist societies. I conclude by amending political liberalism so that it is not vulnerable to the criticism that it is unacceptably 'particularist' in nature. ;In chapter two I advance a conception of mutual respect appropriate for political liberalism, which I call 'civic respect.' Civic respect affirms the free and equal status of persons qua citizens despite the fact of pluralism. ;In chapter three, drawing on Margaret Gilbert's work on plural subject theory, I explain how the principle of civic respect enables citizens to form 'joint commitments' with respect to certain political matters, and thereby constitute political plural subjects with respect to those commitments. I then use the idea of political plural subjecthood to defend, in chapter four, the idea of public reason, and oppose 'perfectionist' arguments concerning fundamental political questions. ;In chapter five I use the idea of plural subjecthood based on civic respect to advance a political liberal account of political obligation. A society 'well-ordered' by a legitimate conception of justice, I maintain, can be understood as a political plural subject capable of yielding political obligations on its members. ;In chapter six I discuss the education curricular requirements of political liberalism, and the implications of these requirements for contemporary debates over school choice. I criticize the view, which I call the 'convergence thesis,' that claims that the civic educational requirements of political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism are effectively identical. Against this thesis, I explain that the civic educational requirements of political liberalism are generally less demanding than those of comprehensive liberalism, and hence permit a greater range of educational options for families than most varieties of comprehensive liberalism.