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Preferences for redistribution are sensitive to perceived luck, social homogeneity, war and scarcity
Cognition 198 (C):104234 (2020)
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Citations of this work
In defence of fear: COVID-19, crises and democracy.Dan Degerman, Matthew Flinders & Matthew Thomas Johnson - 2020 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-22.
Cognition and Society: Prolegomenon to a Dialog.Thom Scott-Phillips & Daniel Nettle - 2022 - Cognitive Science 46 (6):e13162.
References found in this work
Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence, and the future.John Mikhail - 1912 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):143 –152.
Sacrificial utilitarian judgments do reflect concern for the greater good: Clarification via process dissociation and the judgments of philosophers.Paul Conway, Jacob Goldstein-Greenwood, David Polacek & Joshua D. Greene - 2018 - Cognition 179 (C):241-265.
Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations.Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt & Brian A. Nosek - 2009 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96 (5):1029-1046.
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