Turing machine arguments

Philosophy of Science 47 (4):630-633 (1980)
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Abstract

In I used Turing machine arguments to show that computers can recognize humanly recognizable patterns in principle. In 1978 James D. Heffernan has expressed some doubts about such arguments. He does not question the propositions that I defend in the paper, nor the specific arguments in their support. What he does criticize are certain background assumptions.

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References found in this work

On mechanical recognition.R. J. Nelson - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (1):24-52.
Mechanism, functionalism, and the identity theory.R. J. Nelson - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (13):365-385.
Mechanism, functionalism, and the identity theory.Raymond J. Nelson - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):365-86.
Some doubts about Turing machine arguments.James D. Heffernan - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (December):638-647.

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