Abstract

I consider the issues that recent feminist critiques of science raise for contemporary empiricist philosophy of science. Three particular focuses of feminist criticism are addressed: the social arrangements within and outside science communities that divide cognitive labor and authority, the apparent androcentrism in several of the social and biological sciences, and the use of models that reflect Western political experience in the biological sciences. ;I urge that a consideration of these issues indicate that science communities interact with our larger society with consequences for the directions of scientific research, and with consequences for our common sense understandings of human and nonhuman nature. In the light of feminist criticisms, I re-examine the philosophy of science of a major American philosopher, W. V. O. Quine. The interplay between Quine's work and feminist scholarship provides support for two thesis. ;First, I urge that contemporary philosophy of science has too narrowly construed the factors relevant to the epistemology of science. Among the factors that feminists have shown to have an impact on research programs and theoretical frameworks are Western gender arrangements and Western political experience generally. Much contemporary philosophy of science lacks the categories that would enable these factors to be incorporated in the epistemology of science. I argue that frameworks need to be developed that can both accommodate these factors and account for the success of our theorizing. ;Secondly, I urge that the thesis of "epistemological individualism" be abandoned by empiricists. I argue that the feminist criticisms considered and aspects of Quine's philosophy of science indicate that the thesis is empirically unsound. I argue that the acquirers of knowledge are communities, and not individuals, and I use aspects of Quine's philosophy of science and the current presence of androcentric and feminist perspectives in the sciences to support this view