More bad news for the logical autonomy of ethics

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):203-216 (2007)
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Abstract

Are there good arguments from Is to Ought? Toomas Karmo has claimed that there are trivially valid arguments from Is to Ought, but no sound ones. I call into question some key elements of Karmo’s argument for the “logical autonomy of ethics”, and show that attempts to use it as part of an overall case for moral skepticism would be self-defeating.

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References found in this work

Moral Skepticism and Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The autonomy of ethics.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):199 – 206.
Logic and the autonomy of ethics.Charles R. Pigden - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):127 – 151.
The refutation of realism.W. T. Stace - 1934 - Mind 43 (170):145-155.

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