Deductive program verification (a practitioner's commentary)

Minds and Machines 2 (3):283-307 (1992)
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Abstract

A proof of ‘correctness’ for a mathematical algorithm cannot be relevant to executions of a program based on that algorithm because both the algorithm and the proof are based on assumptions that do not hold for computations carried out by real-world computers. Thus, proving the ‘correctness’ of an algorithm cannot establish the trustworthiness of programs based on that algorithm. Despite the (deceptive) sameness of the notations used to represent them, the transformation of an algorithm into an executable program is a wrenching metamorphosis that changes a mathematical abstraction into a prescription for concrete actions to be taken by real computers. Therefore, it is verification of program executions (processes) that is needed, not of program texts that are merely the scripts for those processes. In this view, verification is the empirical investigation of: (a) the behavior that programs invoke in a computer system and (b) the larger context in which that behavior occurs. Here, deduction can play no more, and no less, a role than it does in the empirical sciences.

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Citations of this work

The philosophy of computer science.Raymond Turner - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How minds can be computational systems.William J. Rapaport - 1998 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (4):403-419.
Discussion reviews.Henry E. Kyburg & David A. Nelson - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (1):81-101.

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References found in this work

Proofs and refutations: the logic of mathematical discovery.Imre Lakatos (ed.) - 1976 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Proofs and refutations (IV).I. Lakatos - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (56):296-342.
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Program verification: the very idea.James H. Fetzer - 1988 - Communications of the Acm 31 (9):1048--1063.
Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery.Daniel Isaacson - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111):169-171.

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