Conceptual Distinctions and the Concept of Substance in Descartes

ProtoSociology 30:192-205 (2013)
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Abstract

Descartes’s interrelated theories of attributes and conceptual distinction (or rational distinc­tion) are developed. This follows Nolan (1997) in identifying substances and their attributes as they exist apart from the mind’s concepts. This resource is then used to articulate a solution to a famous problem about Descartes’s concept of substance. The key is that the concept of substance is itself to be regarded as an attribute of independently existing things.

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Alan Nelson
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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The unity of substance and attribute in Spinoza.R. Kyle Driggers - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (1):45-63.

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