In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press (2021)

Authors
Julia Nefsky
University of Toronto at Scarborough
Abstract
When one is going through a personal hardship, it is often comforting, or emotionally helpful, to hear from someone else who has gone through something similar. This is a common, familiar human phenomenon, but this chapter argues that it is philosophically puzzling. Unless one is in some sort of moment of vice, one would not want the other person to have suffered the hardship, and one should be pained to hear that they have. And yet the phenomenon is that hearing about their similar hardship makes one feel better, rather than worse. Why is that? The chapter considers a range of intuitive replies. It argues that while each might be part of the story, none resolves the puzzle. There remains a question as to why the phenomenon does not reflect a vice of insufficient care or concern for others. It then considers two possible answers, drawing on ideas from Adams and Bommarito, but argues that neither are satisfactory. The aim of the chapter is to bring out the puzzle and show that it is difficult to resolve. But it ends with a suggestion for a resolution.
Keywords virtue  vice  care  concern  hardship  suffering  puzzle
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Introduction: Virtue and Vice.Heather Battaly - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):1-21.
Motivational Approaches to Intellectual Vice.Charlie Crerar - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):753-766.
Open-Mindedness as a Moral Virtue.Nomy Arpaly - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):75.
Countering the Vices: On the Neglected Side of Character Education.Tal Gilead - 2011 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 30 (3):271-284.
Is Care a Virtue for Health Care Professionals?Howard J. Curzer - 1993 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 18 (1):51-69.
The Vice of Pride.Robert C. Roberts - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (2):119-133.
Charging Others With Epistemic Vice.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):181-197.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-01-31

Total views
217 ( #48,632 of 2,461,408 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
107 ( #5,983 of 2,461,408 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes