Incommensurability in Population Ethics

Dissertation, University of Oxford (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Values are incommensurable when they cannot be measured on a single cardinal scale. Many philosophers suggest that incommensurability can help us solve the problems of population ethics. I agree. But some philosophers claim that populations bear incommensurable values merely because they contain different numbers of people, perhaps within some range. I argue that mere differences in how many people exist, even within some range, do not suffice for incommensurability. I argue that the intuitive neutrality of creating happy people is better captured by a version of average utilitarianism. But this view is problematic. So I suggest a version of total utilitarianism that avoids the repugnant conclusion by appealing to incommensurable dimensions of wellbeing.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Very Repugnant Conclusion.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2003 - In Krister Segerberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Law, Morality: Thirteen Essays in Practical Philosophy in Honour of Lennart Åqvist. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University. pp. 29-44.
In defence of repugnance.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):899-933.
The repugnant conclusion.Jesper Ryberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Broome and the intuition of neutrality.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):389-411.
Incommensurability and moral value.Mark R. Reiff - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (3):237-268.
Repugnance or Intransitivity: A Repugnant But Forced Choice.Stuart Rachels - 2004 - In Jesper Ryberg Torbjorn Tannsjo (ed.), The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 163--86.
Negative Average Preference Utilitarianism.Roger Chao - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy of Life 2 (1):55-66.
Prioritarianism and Population Ethics.Nils Holtug - 2012 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 25 (1):45-56.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-09-13

Downloads
423 (#42,305)

6 months
162 (#15,686)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jake Nebel
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Totalism without Repugnance.Jacob M. Nebel - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich & Ketan Ramakrishnan (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 200-231.
Spectrum arguments and hypersensitivity.Theron Pummer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1729-1744.
What does incommensurability tell us about agency?Luke Elson - 2021 - In Henrik Andersson & Anders Herlitz (eds.), Value Incommensurability: Ethics, Risk. And Decision-Making. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 181-198.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

View all 69 references / Add more references