Ethics 129 (2):309-343 (2019)

Authors
Jake Nebel
University of Southern California
Abstract
I present a new argument for the repugnant conclusion. The core of the argument is a risky, intrapersonal analogue of the mere addition paradox. The argument is important for three reasons. First, some solutions to Parfit’s original puzzle do not obviously generalize to the intrapersonal puzzle in a plausible way. Second, it raises independently important questions about how to make decisions under uncertainty for the sake of people whose existence might depend on what we do. And, third, it suggests various difficulties for leading views about the value of a person’s life compared to her nonexistence.
Keywords repugnant conclusion  mere addition paradox  value of existence  ethics of risk  decision theory
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Reprint years 2018, 2019
DOI 10.1086/700085
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References found in this work BETA

Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Weighing Lives.John Broome - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.

View all 47 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Totalism Without Repugnance.Jacob M. Nebel - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich & Ketan Ramakrishnan (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 200-231.
Asymmetries in the Value of Existence.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):126-145.
Conservatisms About the Valuable.Jacob M. Nebel - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):180-194.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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