What is wrong with the appendage theory of consciousness?

Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):137-54 (1993)


The present article distinguishes three kinds of accounts of direct awareness : mental-eye theory, self-intimational theory and appendage theory. These aim to explain the same phenomenon, though each proposes that direct awareness occurs in a fundamentally different way. Also, I address a crucial problem that appendage theory must solve: how does a direct awareness succeed in being awareness specifically of the particular mental-occurrence instance that is its object? Appendage theory is singled out for this attention because psychologists, as they embark on their renewed study of consciousness, are most likely to be attracted by appendage theory for their explanation of direct awareness

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References found in this work

Science, Perception and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars (ed.) - 1963 - New York: Humanities Press.
Minds, Brains and Science.John Searle - 1984 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.

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Citations of this work

On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Is Intentionality Dependent Upon Consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.

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