The case for intrinsic theory: I. An introduction

Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286 (1996)

Abstract

This is the introductory installment in a projected series of articles in which I shall be advancing the positive case for the "intrinsic" kind of explanatory account of "consciousness4." "Consciousness4" has reference to a property of individual mental-occurrence instances wherein there takes place an immediate awareness of them either upon their occurrence or as part of their very occurrence. The immediacy or directness of such inner awareness amounts to the absence of mental mediation by any other occurrent awareness. An account of consciousness4 that properly comes under the heading of "intrinsic theory" is distinguished by the thesis that a mental-occurrence instance’s being conscious4 is an intrinsic property, rather than an external-relational property of that mental-occurrence instance. My hope for the present series of articles is that, by the end, the case for intrinsic theory will he so evidently strong, or at least so vivid, that all psychologists of consciousness will have to address intrinsic theory and its explanandum of consciousness4. In this article, I set the stage by rendering some of the relevant meanings explicit, spelling out my purpose and approach to making the case for intrinsic theory, providing some context for the discussions to follow, and mentioning important objections to intrinsic theory that have been voiced in the literature

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Citations of this work

Is Intentionality Dependent Upon Consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.
What Certainty Teaches.Tomas Bogardus - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):227 - 243.

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