Abelson's refutation of mind-body identity

Philosophical Studies 23 (1-2):116-118 (1972)
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Abstract

R. Abelson argues that the identity theory is false because it is possible to have an infinite number of thoughts (e.G. Of natural numbers) while the number of possible brain states is finite. The refutation fails because it conflates the logical possibility of having infinite thoughts with the actual ability to have them. The latter depends on many contingent facts, One of which may be the number of possible brain states

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Stephen Nathanson
Northeastern University

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