Bias and Conditioning in Sequential medical trials

Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1053-1064 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Randomized Controlled Trials are currently the gold standard within evidence-based medicine. Usually, they are conducted as sequential trials allowing for monitoring for early signs of effectiveness or harm. However, evidence from early stopped trials is often charged with being biased towards implausibly large effects. To our mind, this skeptical attitude is unfounded and caused by the failure to perform appropriate conditioning in the statistical analysis of the evidence. We contend that a shift from unconditional hypothesis tests in the style of Neyman and Pearson to conditional hypothesis tests gives a superior appreciation of the obtained evidence and significantly improves the practice of sequential medical trials, while staying firmly rooted in frequentist methodology.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Modelling and simulating early stopping of RCTs: a case study of early stop due to harm.Roger Stanev - 2012 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 24 (4):513-526.
Evidence and experimental design in sequential trials.Jan Sprenger - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):637-649.
The philosophy of evidence-based medicine.Jeremy H. Howick - 2011 - Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, BMJ Books.
Bayesian versus frequentist clinical trials.David Teira - 2011 - In Gifford Fred (ed.), Philosophy of Medicine. Amsterdam: Elsevier. pp. 255-297.
What makes placebo-controlled trials unethical?Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody - 2002 - American Journal of Bioethics 2 (2):3 – 9.
Is meta-analysis the platinum standard of evidence?Jacob Stegenga - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (4):497-507.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-11-09

Downloads
75 (#216,283)

6 months
8 (#342,364)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jan Sprenger
University of Turin

References found in this work

Error and the growth of experimental knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):455-459.
Evidence in medicine and evidence-based medicine.John Worrall - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):981–1022.
Principles of inference and their consequences.Deborah G. Mayo & Michael Kruse - 2001 - In David Corfield & Jon Williamson (eds.), Foundations of Bayesianism. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 381--403.

View all 8 references / Add more references