Neither moralists, nor scientists: We are counterfactually reasoning animals

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):347-348 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We are neither scientists nor moralists. Our mental capacities (such as attributing intentionality) are neither akin to the scientist's exact reasoning, nor are they (Knobe's target article, sect. 2.2, last para.). They are more similar to all those simple capacities that humans and animals are equally capable of, but with enhanced sensitivity to counterfactual situations: of what could have been

Similar books and articles

Decent conduct toward animals: A traditional approach.Stephen R. L. Clark - 1999 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):61-83.
Wittgenstein and Ant-watching.Deborah M. Gordon - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (1):13-25.
The three rs: A restrictive and refutable rigmarole.H. Lansdell - 1993 - Ethics and Behavior 3 (2):177 – 185.
Transitive inference in animals: Reasoning or conditioned associations?Colin Allen - 2006 - In Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
Science, knowledge, and animal minds.Dale Jamieson - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):79–102.
Ethical obligations of veterinarians and animal scientists in animal agriculture.Bernard E. Rollin - 1989 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 2 (3):225-234.
Animals and Sociology.Kay Peggs - 2012 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
Person as Moral Scientist.Nicholas Humphrey - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):340.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-10-27

Downloads
234 (#83,046)

6 months
58 (#73,015)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Bence Nanay
University of Antwerp

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations