Evolutionary Game of Social Network for Emergency Mobilization (SNEM) of Magnitude Emergencies: Evidence from China

Complexity 2022:1-13 (2022)
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Abstract

As a common social network, the SNEM plays an important role in emergency management. Magnitude emergencies are characterized by high complexity and uncertainty, and it is impossible to rely on the government for emergency management alone. We should absorb multiple subjects to build the SNEM and carry out extensive emergency mobilization in the whole society. The SNEM can integrate resources, gather consensus, promote participation, and reduce risks. The analysis of the types, generation mechanism, subject behavior, and strategy selection of the SNEM aid in adopting appropriate mobilization strategy based on magnitude emergencies, achieving the adaptation of the SNEM and emergency scenarios. By constructing the evolutionary game model of the SNEM for magnitude emergencies, taking China as an empirical sample, this paper explores the behavior evolution law and stable strategy of the government, social organizations, and the public. The results showed that the symbiotic SNEM with a positive response of social organizations and the public under the path of high-intensity mobilization by the government is the best strategy combination, and it is conducive to maximizing the emergency joint force.

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