Abstract

The topic of simplicity as a theoretical virtue is analyzed in this work. Versions of logical simplicity, inductive simplicity, and theoretical simplicity are considered. The account of simplicity presented in this work is a unificatory account of simplicity. In this work, an attempt is made to gain an understanding of simplicity by examining a simplicity-making property, like unification. It was found that simplicity of theories and explanations cannot be assessed by merely counting the number of hypotheses and laws contained in them. In order to understand the simplicity attending theories and explanations, certain structural properties and interconnections needs to be considered. The unificatory account of simplicity presented in this work attempts to explicate theoretical simplicity by examining the "workings" of paradigmatic simple theories. The paradigmatic cases of simple theories considered in this work are mainly from the field of science. These theories are discussed since they presented in a relatively clearer way their theoretical interconnections and the ways by which they were supported by the relevant data. It was found that in unified theories, the relation between theory and evidence was different from that of non-simple theories. In this work, the notion of unification was explicated via ways by which theory and evidence were linked. Glymour's version of the bootstrap strategy of confirmation was used in this regard. It was found that unified-simple theories laid themselves open to better confirmation, and were better tested and supported by the data. The account of simplicity given in this work leaves open the possibility for a hierarchy of simple theories depending on their differences in unification. The basic idea behind the unificatory account of simplicity could also be extended to other areas of study besides science