The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox

In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The lottery paradox involves a set of judgments that are individually easy, when we think intuitively, but ultimately hard to reconcile with each other, when we think reflectively. Empirical work on the natural representation of probability shows that a range of interestingly different intuitive and reflective processes are deployed when we think about possible outcomes in different contexts. Understanding the shifts in our natural ways of thinking can reduce the sense that the lottery paradox reveals something problematic about our concept of knowledge. However, examining these shifts also raises interesting questions about how we ought to be thinking about possible outcomes in the first place.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

How to Understand and Solve the Lottery Paradox.Patrick Bondy - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):283-292.
Fallibilism and the Lottery paradox.Baron Reed - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:217-225.
Three Puzzles about Lotteries.Julia Staffel - 2020 - In Igor Douven (ed.), Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
The Lottery Paradox Generalized?Jake Chandler - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):667-679.
The Sequential Lottery Paradox.I. Douven - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):55-57.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-03

Downloads
886 (#14,804)

6 months
186 (#12,642)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jennifer Nagel
University of Toronto, Mississauga

Citations of this work

Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.
Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Strong Belief is Ordinary.Roger Clarke - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
Ordinary Meaning and Consilience of Evidence.Justin Sytsma - 2023 - In Stefan Magen & Karolina Prochownik (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Law. Bloomsbury Academic.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
The Enigma of Reason.Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.) - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.

View all 36 references / Add more references