Artificial moral agents: an intercultural perspective

Abstract

In this paper I will argue that artificial moral agents are a fitting subject of intercultural information ethics because of the impact they may have on the relationship between information rich and information poor countries. I will give a limiting definition of AMAs first, and discuss two different types of AMAs with different implications from an intercultural perspective. While AMAs following preset rules might raise con-cerns about digital imperialism, AMAs being able to adjust to their user‘s behavior will lead us to the question what makes an AMA ―moral‖? I will argue that this question does present a good starting point for an inter-cultural dialogue which might be helpful to overcome the notion of Africa as a mere victim

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Citations of this work

Robots: Ethical by Design.Gordana Dodig Crnkovic & Baran Çürüklü - 2012 - Ethics and Information Technology 14 (1):61-71.

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