Bayesianism and diverse evidence: A reply to Andrew Wayne

Philosophy of Science 63 (4):661-665 (1996)
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Abstract

Andrew Wayne discusses some recent attempts to account, within a Bayesian framework, for the "common methodological adage" that "diverse evidence better confirms a hypothesis than does the same amount of similar evidence". One of the approaches considered by Wayne is that suggested by Howson and Urbach and dubbed the "correlation approach" by Wayne. This approach is, indeed, incomplete, in that it neglects the role of the hypothesis under consideration in determining what diversity in a body of evidence is relevant diversity. In this paper, it is shown how this gap can be filled, resulting in a more satisfactory account of the evidential role of diversity of evidence. In addition, it is argued that Wayne's criticism of the correlation approach does not indicate a serious flaw in the approach

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References found in this work

Bayesianism and diverse evidence.Andrew Wayne - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (1):111-121.
The Logical Foundations of Probability. [REVIEW]Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (13):362-364.
Review. [REVIEW]Barry Gower - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):555-559.

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