Abstract

This thesis explores Aristotle's view of the role which friendship $$ plays in choice. Its point of departure is Aristotle's claim that $\phi\iota\lambda\'\iota\alpha$ is "in some sense a virtue or with virtue" $.$ The discussion begins with the definition of virtue as a stable disposition $,$ concerned with choice, which is in accordance with the relative mean . It is argued first that certain forms of comrade-$\phi\iota\lambda\'\iota\alpha,$ family-$\phi\iota\lambda\'\iota\alpha,$ and partner-$\phi\iota\lambda\'\iota\alpha$ are ${\buildrel{,\sb\prime}\over{\varepsilon}}\xi\varepsilon\iota\varsigma$ by Aristotelian criteria: they are stable states in each friend with regard to the emotion $\phi\'\iota\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma;$ grounded in man's political nature, that is, his natural capacity to engage in cooperative enterprises $;$ perfected by the practice of appropriate actions; and manifested in characteristic acts done in characteristically "friendly" ways. ;Because all friendships arise in $\kappa o\iota\nu\omega\nu\'\iota\alpha\iota$ and the $\kappa o\iota\nu\omega\nu\'\iota\alpha\iota$ into which a man naturally enters are complementary in ends and activities, it is argued next that a man's various friendships form a complementary "web of friendships," and that Aristotelian $\phi\iota\lambda\'\iota\alpha$ is therefore best understood as a "global" ${\buildrel{,\sb\prime}\over{\varepsilon}}\xi\iota\varsigma$ which regulates responses to the competing claims of various friends. When this global ${\buildrel{,\sb\prime}\over{\varepsilon}}\xi\iota\varsigma$ is properly developed, particular $\phi\iota\lambda\'\iota\alpha\iota,$ like the moral virtues, aim at the "relative mean" in their characteristic emotion and acts. ;Finally, it is shown that $\phi\iota\lambda\'\iota\alpha,$ as a ${\buildrel{,\sb\prime}\over{\varepsilon}}\xi\iota\varsigma$ with regard to an emotion, brings to practical reasoning desire $$ which is directed toward an end. Like the moral virtues, $\phi\iota\lambda\'\iota\alpha$ thus establishes an end which is the starting point of deliberation and an efficient cause of choice. Because the moral virtues establish the end that is to be achieved $,$ while $\phi\iota\lambda\'\iota\alpha$ establishes the end to be benefitted $,$ they play complementary roles in choice. ;Aristotle's claim about $\phi\iota\lambda\'\iota\alpha$ at EN 1155a2 thus indicates that friendship is "in some sense" a moral virtue $$ due to its important similarities to the moral virtues, and that it is "with" moral virtue $,$ because it cooperates with moral virtues in establishing the complementary ends of choice.