The Folk Epistemology of Delusions

Neuroethics 5 (1):19-22 (2012)

Abstract

Lisa Bortolotti argues convincingly that opponents of the doxastic view of delusion are committed to unnecessarily stringent standards for belief attribution. Folk psychology recognises many non-rational ways in which beliefs can be caused, and our attributions of delusions may be guided by a sense that delusions are beliefs that we cannot explain in any folk psychological terms

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Dominic Murphy
University of Sydney

References found in this work

The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Princeton University Press.
The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1994 - Princeton University Press.
The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 186 (1):187-189.
Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations.Gregory Currie - 2000 - In Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.), Mind and Language. Blackwell. pp. 168-183.
Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations.Gregory Currie - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):168-183.

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Citations of this work

Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Doctors Without ‘Disorders’.Lisa Bortolotti - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):163-184.
Delusions as Harmful Malfunctioning Beliefs.Kengo Miyazono - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:561-573.

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