Neo-Cartesianism and the Problem of Animal Suffering

Faith and Philosophy 23 (2):169-190 (2006)
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Abstract

The existence and extent of animal suffering provides grounds for a serious evidential challenge to theism. In the wake of the Darwinian revolution, this strain of natural atheology has taken on substantially greater significance. In this essay we argue that there are at least four neo-Cartesian views on the nature of animal minds which would serve to deflect this evidential challenge.

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Michael Paul Murray
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Reconsidering fetal pain.Stuart W. G. Derbyshire & John C. Bockmann - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics Recent Issues 46 (1):3-6.
Animal suffering as a challenge to theistic theodicy.Andrea Aguti - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 78 (4-5):498-510.

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References found in this work

Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & Guy Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):515-526.
The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.William L. Rowe - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):335 - 341.
19 The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.William Rowe - 1979 - In Eleonore Stump & Michael J. Murray (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 6--157.
Do minds exist in species other than our own?G. G. Gallup - 1985 - Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 9:631-41.

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