Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):602-617 (2017)
AbstractUnder what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially justified belief that is more permissive and more complex than JFJ.
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References found in this work
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
What is Justified Belief?Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work
Knowledge From Forgetting.Sven Bernecker & Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-540.
Knowledge From Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):833-845.
A Dilemma for the Knowledge Despite Falsehood Strategy.Christopher Buford & Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):166-182.
Knowing the Facts, Alternative and Otherwise.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Rodrigo Borges & Ian Schnee (eds.), Illuminating Errors: New Essays on Knowledge from Non-Knowledge. Routledge.
Agent Reliabilism and Inferential Knowledge From Gettiered Belief.K. Merrick Olivier - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):130-145.
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