Another Look at Novel Facts

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 20 (3):385 (1989)
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10.1016/0039-3681(89)90014-9

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Heuristic novelty and the asymmetry problem in bayesian confirmation theory.Richard Nunan - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):17-36.

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