Testimonial injustice and prescriptive credibility deficits

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):924-947 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In light of recent social psychological literature, I expand Miranda Fricker’s important notion of testimonial injustice. A fair portion of Fricker’s account rests on an older paradigm of stereotype and prejudice. Given recent empirical work, I argue for what I dub prescriptive credibility deficits in which a backlash effect leads to the assignment of a diminished level of credibility to persons who act in counter-stereotypic manners, thereby flouting prescriptive stereotypes. The notion of a prescriptive credibility deficit is not merely an interesting conceptual addendum that can be appended to Fricker’s theory without need for further emendation. I develop the wider implications of prescriptive credibility deficits and argue that they pose a challenge to Fricker’s conception of the function of credibility assignments in conversational exchange and how a virtuous listener should respond to the potential threat of a prejudicial stereotype affecting her credibility assignments.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 96,689

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-07-13

Downloads
183 (#117,961)

6 months
36 (#119,250)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Wade Munroe
University of Nebraska, Lincoln