Mental Imagery and the Epistemology of Testimony

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):428-449 (2022)
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Abstract

Mental imagery often occurs during testimonial belief transmission: a testifier often episodically remembers or imagines a scene while describing it, while a listener often imagines that scene as it’s described to her. I argue that getting clear on imagery’s psychological roles in testimonial belief transmission has implications for some fundamental issues in the epistemology of testimony. I first appeal to imagery cases to argue against a widespread “internalist” approach to the epistemology of testimony. I then appeal to the same sort of case to argue for an alternative, externalist view.

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Daniel Munro
York University

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