Abstract

This dissertation is a philosophical investigation into a neuroscientific subject: Mapping the brain. After a brief introduction, the first of five chapters sets forth the scientific issue and explains why it is of philosophical interest. Through actual examples of research into mapping the visual system and the frontal lobe, as well as the commonly used criteria for the delineation of distinct brain areas, I am able to indicate the nature of the difficulties, assumptions, and questions associated with the more general problem of mapping the brain. Chapter Two is an historical survey of the major figures , debates , and assumptions which helped to shape modern brain mapping. In Chapter Three I provide conceptual analyses of form, function, and the relation between them, in the context of brain cartography. Mainly, I argue that these analyses require contextualization, are level-relative, significantly empirical, and that function in this context is most appropriately construed teleologically. Chapter Four shows the importance of brain mapping research to certain debates in the philosophy of mind/cognitive science, particularly the debate about identity theory, and architectural debates, such as the modularity hypothesis. In the former case, I argue that casting the issue in terms of types and tokens necessitates a taxonomic framework which at best is yet incomplete. Chapter Five deals with methodological issues concerning the relationship between psychology and neuroscience in the context of brain cartography. Here, I argue that this scientific endeavor has been, and will likely continue to be, well served by a pluralistic approach between psychology and neuroscience. Borrowing from existing pluralistic models, I develop and describe my own approach, termed "mutual approximation". This chapter is followed by a brief, summarizing conclusion.