Facts

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
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Kevin Mulligan
Università della Svizzera Italiana

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
On what grounds what.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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