Acta Philosophica 20 (2):383 - 404 (2011)

Jennifer Mulnix
University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth
This paper represents a response to the criticisms made by Eric Barnes in “Explanatory Unification and the Problem of Asymmetry” and “Explanatory Unification and Scientific Understanding” against the thesis of Explanatory Unification. This paper responds to Barnes‟ two main criticisms, that of derivational skepticism and causal asymmetry, and successfully refutes his objections. This paper also defends the plausibility of the unificationist account of scientific explanation because of its ability to render coherent the notion of scientific understanding, focusing in particular on the work by Michael Friedman and Philip Kitcher.
Keywords philosophy of science  explanatory unification
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,464
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Explanatory Unification and Scientific Understanding.Eric Barnes - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:3 - 12.
Reductionism and the Unification Theory of Explanation.Todd Jones - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (1):21-30.
Explanatory Unification and the Problem of Asymmetry.Eric Barnes - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):558-571.
Explaining Brute Facts.Eric Barnes - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:61-68.
Explanatory Unification and the Early Synthesis.Anya Plutynski - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):595-609.


Added to PP index

Total views
133 ( #89,153 of 2,520,747 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #405,718 of 2,520,747 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes