Abstract

Religion in the generic sense is presented as an irreducible mode of human judgment. By emphasizing the generic character of religion Arnett sets himself against the "sectarians," those who would claim unique worth for a particular tradition. By arguing for the irreducible nature of religious judgment he opposes himself to the "secularists," those who would reduce religion to some other mode of judgment, or to a non-cognitive status. The strongest chapters are the third and fourth, which deal with the relation of religion to morality and art, respectively. While vigorous arguments are presented against those who tend to identify religion with one or the other, e.g., Dewey and Santayana, the problems are not oversimplified, and careful attention is given to the affinities as well as the discontinuities involved. The discussion of religion and truth deals more with the generic value of religious judgment than with the question of the truth of particular religious judgments.—M. W.