Abstract
Like Aristotle, Wittgenstein’s leitmotif was action. Wittgenstein saw action (or behaviour) as the root, manifestation and transmitter of meaning. He repeatedly demonstrated the regress manifest in seeing the proposition, or any kind of representation, as a necessary precursor to thought and action, or at least he pointed out the superfluity of such shadowy inner precursors when instinct and practices can easily be seen to be at the base of all our thought: ‘In philosophy one is in constant danger of producing a myth of symbolism, or a myth of mental processes. Instead of simply saying what anyone knows and must admit’ (Z, §211). Where Aristotle warns us that Plato had been misled by the uniform appearance of a word in different contexts into believing that it had a uniform meaning across uses, Wittgenstein urges us to see the differences in meaning that are often hidden by the uniform appearance of language, insisting that meaning is dependent on use or context. Just as Aristotle in the Categories gave Plato’s forms a linguistic status, so, Wittgenstein took a linguistic turn from his predecessors, giving metaphysics a grammatical reading: both showed that concepts are not entities existing in isolated splendour in some metaphysical realm but simply abstractions from sentences in use.