Haack on Fallibilism

Analysis 40 (4):177-183 (1980)
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Abstract

I contend that s. Haack's proposed definition of fallibilism is unsatisfactory being equivalent to the assertion that we can believe anything. I say that fallibilism is best conceived as the doctrine that all our theories are false.

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Zur Antinomik der Fehlbarkeit.Mike Stange - 2021 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 75 (1):5-32.

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