Philosophia 42 (4):1033-1053 (2014)

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Abstract
It is usually taken for granted, in discussions about fiction, that real things or events can occur as referents of fictional names . In this paper, I take issue with this view, and provide several arguments to the effect that it is better to take the names in fiction to refer to fictional surrogates of real objects. Doing so allows us to solve a series of problems that arise on the reference-continuity view. I also show that the arguments philosophers usually rely on in order to ban surrogates are not as serious as they have been taken to be. In the first part of the paper, I describe the two conflicting views. In the second part, I discuss several specific arguments in favor of surrogates. In the third part I take up the kind of reasons ordinarily offered against them
Keywords Fictional characters  Fiction and reality  Literature  Metaphysics  Surrogates
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-014-9522-1
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

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Citations of this work BETA

What is Bitcoin?Craig Warmke - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Co‐Identification and Fictional Names.Manuel García‐Carpintero - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):3-34.
Reference in Fiction.Stacie Friend - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (54):179-206.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

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