The implications of rejecting free will: An empirical analysis

Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):299-321 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

While skeptical arguments concerning free will have been a common element of philosophical discourse for thousands of years, one could make the case that such arguments have never been more numerous or forceful than at present. In response to these skeptical attacks, some philosophers and psychologists have expressed concern that the widespread acceptance of such skeptical attitudes could have devastating social consequences. In this paper, I set out to address whether such concerns are well-founded. I argue that there is reason to believe that should skeptical arguments result in the widespread dismissal of human free will, the results of such a dismissal are likely to be more positive than negative.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,154

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Free Will, Complexity, Dynamical Systems, and All That Jazz.Robert Kane - 2023 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 30:1-22.
The parent–child analogy and the limits of skeptical theism.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (3):301-314.
Modest transcendental arguments.Anthony Brueckner - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:265-280.
Skeptical Theism Proved.Perry Hendricks - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (2):264-274.
Are We Rarely Free? A Response to Restrictivism.Pettit Gordon - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):219-237.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-10-09

Downloads
117 (#159,664)

6 months
26 (#147,512)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
Hard incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2007 - In John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom & Manuel Vargas (eds.), Four Views on Free Will. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):222-229.

View all 9 references / Add more references