Three Concepts of Character

Phenomenology and Mind 21:154-166 (2021)
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Abstract

The concept of character has a long history in moral philosophy. Three fundamental versions can be identified: the Aristotelian, the Humean, and the Kantian. The Aristotelian concept of character is based on the model of the wise person, who shapes her feeling according to reason. The Humean character is based exclusively on feelings, having as a criterion the feeling of approval for virtue and disapproval for vice. The Kantian character is based on freedom as autonomy and on the feeling of respect. I argue that the Kantian concept avoids the risk of depending on metaphysics (as the Aristotelian model does) and of lacking universal value (as the Humean model does).

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